研究測得 Wi-Fi 被動按鍵推斷 F₁ 達 85.4%,RF-Guard 韌體混淆將準確率降至 9.8%
Your router can read your keyboard: 85% keystroke recovery from Wi-Fi, and the firmware fix that cut it to 9.8%
研究以雙向 LSTM 將 Wi-Fi CSI 序列與按鍵特徵關聯,測得被動推斷的 F₁ 在視線可及辦公室達 85.4%,隔着 15 cm 石膏板仍為 61.2%。
Your Wi-Fi router can read your keyboard. Not by breaking encryption — by measuring the air.
Wi-Fi was designed to move data. Paired with modern deep learning it has quietly become something else: a sensing fabric that detects motion, infers behaviour, and reconstructs physical activity from signal reflections alone, on hardware cheaper than a home router. Enterprise and IoT security was never built for that pairing.
Our paper measures how bad it is, in realistic interference-prone environments, using a bidirectional LSTM trained to correlate Channel State Information (CSI) sequences with keystroke signatures.
A passive adversary — commodity hardware, no network authentication, no physical access, not one injected packet — reaches F₁ 85.4% in line-of-sight office conditions. Through a standard 15 cm drywall partition it still reaches F₁ 61.2%. For context, a ten-class random guess floor is 10%. That is over six times chance, through a wall, passively.
Then we tried to kill it at the source. RF-Guard is a deterministic, stateful CSI obfuscation framework at the firmware level. Across three testbeds it cut the observer's accuracy to 9.8% — below the random-guess floor.
Two takeaways:
- If you deploy Wi-Fi for connectivity only, you are also deploying a sensor, and your threat model does not include a passive RF observer.
- The mitigation that worked was not "detect the attack". It was making the signal uninformative at the point it is radiated.
Presented at IC-AICSE 2026 (abstract book p. 33).
Paper and details: https://sushantpoudel2028.com.np/publications/wifi-sensing
More writing, negative results kept in: https://sushantpoudel2028.com.np/writing
security # ai # iot # privacy
來源:DEV Community · dev.to